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Abstract
Over the last decade, European Union (EU) trade agreement negotiations in the form of the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada have been
strongly contested. By contrast, many other EU trade negotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or barely any
at all. In this contribution, we assess a series of plausible explanation for these very varying degrees of politicization across
EU trade agreement negotiations—conceived of as the combination of polarization of opinions, salience given to them in
public debate, and the expansion of the number of societal actors involved therein. Through a review of existing expla-
nations, we show how each of these explanations faces a set of challenges. In the third section, we argue it is useful to
conceive of these existing explanations as structural background conditions enabling agency on the part of interest group
and civil society organizations. We therefore close by sketching how literature on the relationship between interest group
mobilization and public opinion could inform further comparative research on trade policy negotiations, and on politiciza-
tion of EU policy making in general.
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1. Introduction
Over the last two decades, the European Union (EU) has
conducted an external economic policy very much in line
with that of other major trade powers by prioritizing bi-
lateral trade agreements over multilateral trade opening
within the World Trade Organization (WTO). This strate-
gic shift to preferential trade agreements, economic part-
nership or association agreements has been motivated
by various factors, including the decline of theWTO’s abil-
ity to deliver negotiated trade liberalization and regula-
tion (Poletti & De Bièvre, 2016), the competition with
other trading partners in emerging markets (Dür, 2007)
and the growing integration of the EU’s economy in
global value chains (Eckhardt & Poletti, 2016).
These EU trade agreement negotiations have gener-
ated significant domestic political turmoil, and observers
and analysts have contended that EU trade policy has
evolved into a highly politicized policy area (Laursen &
Roederer-Rynning, 2017; Young, 2017). Defined as an
“increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values
and the extent to which they are publicly advanced to-
wards the process of policy formulation” (deWilde, 2011,
p. 260), or, more broadly, as “making collectively bind-
ing decisions a matter or an object of public discus-
sion” (Zürn, 2014, p. 50), politicization has potentially far
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reaching consequences for trade policymaking. As noted
byDür, Eckhardt, and Poletti (2019), politicization can sys-
tematically triggermore protectionist trade policy prefer-
ences and it can alsomake it harder to bargain overmutu-
ally beneficial trade agreements. The fully-fledged politi-
cization of trade policymaking in the EU—among the
world’s largest economies and trading powers—could
have large consequences for one of the key tools of EU
foreign policymaking, but also for the world trading sys-
tem at large, as this would come at a time in which the
threat of large-scale protectionism re-emerging, inspired
by populist ideology, looms over it.
At the same time, the great variation in degrees of
politicization across trade agreements (as well as across
EU member states) has left many observers, practition-
ers and analysts somewhat baffled. Whereas EU–US ne-
gotiations over a Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP) and EU–Canada negotiations over the
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)
have been strongly contested, many other EU trade ne-
gotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or
barely any at all, leaving one to wonder as to the po-
tential causes. Several existing, plausible explanations for
these varying degrees of politicization across EU trade
agreement negotiations however, provide very generic
explanations that would lead one to expect that all trade
agreements should have become politicized. In this con-
tributionwe therefore review these existing explanations
and parse out whether and where each of these explana-
tions runs into problems. In the third section, we argue
it is useful to conceive of these existing explanations as
structural background conditions enabling agency on the
part of interest group and civil society organizations and
sketch how literature on the relationship between inter-
est group mobilization and public opinion could inform
further comparative research on trade policy negotia-
tions, and on politicization of EU policymaking in general.
2. The Riddle: Varying Degrees of Politicization in EU
Trade Policy
We start by qualifying the proposition that EU trade
policy is now highly politicized. In order to do so, we
first draw a sketch of what a highly politicized trade ne-
gotiation would look like and assess how different EU
trade agreement negotiations fare relative to such an
operational definition. While there are different under-
standings of politicization in EU governance, there is
growing consensus on the conceptualization proposed
by De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke (2016), which con-
ceives of it as a three-dimensional process involving in-
creasing salience, polarization of opinion and the expan-
sion of actors and audiences involved in EU issues (see
also De Bruycker, 2017). The ‘salience’ dimension cap-
tures the importance attributed to the EU and European
integration and it is usuallymeasured empirically by look-
ing at the number of newspaper articles reporting on
European governance or how ‘aware’ or ‘worried’ citi-
zens are of the EU institutions, politics, and policies. The
‘polarization’ dimension gauges the emergence of a po-
larised scenario with diametrically opposed coalitions of
societal groups at extreme positions with neutral voices
having been crowded out, which is usually operational-
ized as polarization of a polity’s party system or as dis-
agreement about European governance in public opin-
ion surveys. Finally, the ‘actor and audience expansion’
dimension captures the growing number of citizens and
collective actors who dedicate resources in the form of
time and money to follow and engage with EU gover-
nance. This can be grasped empirically by the expansion
of actors making it to the news or that are active online
and via social media.
This conceptualization suggests that the discussion
about the politicization of EU trade policy cannot be
confined to an exclusive focus on the traditional politi-
cal conflicts that have always, although with different in-
tensities, underlined the making of EU trade policy. As
in other political systems, trade agreement negotiations
have always sparked significant political conflicts in the
EU. Traditionally, these conflicts have pit two sets of op-
posing concentrated trade-related interests against each
other: export-oriented sectors wishing to see better ac-
cess to foreign markets and import-competing sectors
wishing to reduce exposure to foreign competition do-
mestically (De Bièvre & Dür, 2005; Dür, 2008). In the
last two decades, these two types of actors have been
joined by a third type, EU import-dependent firms, i.e.,
firms relying on the income generated by the imported
intermediate or final goods, presenting themselves as
strong advocates of trade liberalization as a result of
the growing integration of the EU’s economy in global
value chains (Eckhardt & Poletti, 2016; see also Baccini,
Pinto, & Weymouth, 2017). The intensity of conflict be-
tween these trade-related organized interests has on oc-
casion been very high. The vociferous opposition of some
EU members states’ farmers in the Uruguay round or
the car manufacturing sector in the EU–Korea negotia-
tions are but two obvious examples of the potential of
these trade-related interests to raise the intensity of po-
litical conflict underlying trade policy and to weigh on
trade negotiations.
However, the presence of intense political conflicts
between organized societal groups representing concen-
trated trade-related interests alone does not suffice to
qualify a particular negotiation as politicized. The re-
cent contribution by Meunier and Czesana (2019) on the
politicization of EU trade policy acknowledges this impor-
tant point, adding the key dimension of public salience
to the picture. However, as the conceptual discussion de-
veloped above suggests, an exclusive focus on the dimen-
sion salience alone risks overlooking other important di-
mensions of politicization. We therefore go beyond the
discussion by Meunier and Czesana (2019) and consider
EU trade agreement negotiations as politicized when, in
addition to evolving into issues that the general public is
aware of and cares about (saliency), they also contribute
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to making trade policy an issue that polarizes political de-
bates andopinions (polarization), and trigger the political
mobilization of awide array of political actors beyond the
relatively closed circle of trade policy officials and groups
representing trade-related interests such as NGOs and
various kinds of citizen organizations (actor expansion).
With this conceptual yardstick in mind, it turns out
that recent EU trade agreement negotiations differ very
considerably in the degree towhich theywere politicized.
In this contribution, we focus mainly on variation in de-
grees of politicization across the different bilateral or in-
terregional trade negotiations that the EU has initiated.
Although we do touch upon it here and there, we do
not put the important question of how politicization of
trade policy varies across EUmember states centre stage
here. This is an important line of inquiry, especially in
light of an economistic domestic compensation hypoth-
esis. This theoretical expectation would have it that the
anti-globalization backlash should be largest in political
systems that do not sufficiently compensate economic
losers of liberalization (Sapir, 2001, 2006). Yet, politiciza-
tion was highest in coordinated market economies with
a strong welfare state, like Germany and Austria, low in
Scandinavianwelfare states, whereas it was also very low
inmany southern and eastern European countries,which
actively kept supporting the negotiations (Young, 2017,
pp. 71–74).
Moreover, we rely on existing operationalizations of
degrees of politicization (see Steiner, 2018; Young, 2017)
and do not expand on the desirability of a further system-
atic and fine-grained empirical estimate of how these ne-
gotiations fare with regards to each of conceptual dimen-
sion of politicization. Instead, we put our focus on how
thiswide variation in degrees of politicization could be ex-
plained. Several sources are now in wide agreement that
actually only a minority of these negotiations generated
a high degree of politicization (for instance Steiner, 2018;
Young, 2017). Some of the EU’s bilateral trade agree-
ments, and some of its ongoing bilateral negotiations,
did indeed generate unprecedented domestic political
turmoil in the course of the past decade, especially the
TTIP negotiations with the US—now aborted—and the
negotiation and conclusion of the Canada–EU CETA. As
widely documented, TTIP and also CETA quickly evolved
into salient negotiations for the general public and mus-
tered a wave of political contestation by a wide array
of civil society groups, ultimately contributing to polariz-
ing party competition and individual opinions (De Bièvre,
2018; De Bièvre & Poletti, 2016; De Ville & Siles-Brügge,
2015, 2016; Dür, 2018; Gheyle, 2019; Jungherr, Mader,
Schoen, &Wuttke, 2018; Kanthak & Spies, 2018; Laursen
& Roederer-Rynning, 2017; Meunier & Czesana, 2019;
Steiner, 2018; Young, 2016, 2017, 2019).
Other EU bilateral negotiations and agreements,
however, have taken place in the absence of public up-
roar, have barely led to a polarised distribution of opin-
ions, and have not been the subject of attention from
organized societal actors, the media, or the general pub-
lic. These include the ongoing and finished negotiations
with developing countries such as Vietnam, Thailand,
andMalaysia, with advanced industrial and services com-
petitors such as Japan, Singapore, and South Korea, or
the negotiations for an investment-only agreement with
an economic giant such as China. These negotiations did
of course elicit opposition from traditional trade-related
interests fearing the potential costs of liberalizing trade
with these countries, like the European car industry in
the case of the EU–South Korea trade agreement (Elsig
& Dupont, 2012; Gstöhl & De Bièvre, 2018, pp. 93–107;
Siles-Brügge, 2011), or the meat industry being up in
arms about the expansion of Brazilian and Argentinian
beef quota in the draft EU–Mercosur agreement.
Somewhat in between these two extremes, other
negotiations did trigger actor expansion in the form
of political opposition from organized societal groups
other than import-competing groups, particularly by
Civil Society Organizations (CSOs). These include the
comprehensive trade agreement recently reached with
Mercosur, which after approximately two decades in
the doldrums moved into the public limelight late 2019,
the Economic Partnership Agreement negotiations with
former European colonies in the African, Pacific, and
Caribbean region, most of which have failed to realize,
with the notable exception of the agreement with the
CARIFORUM region, and, to a lesser extent, the trade
agreements signed with the Andean Community and
Central American countries (Poletti & Sicurelli, 2018). As
the hot domestic political debate preceding the approval
of the ratification of the EU–Ukraine association agree-
ment in 2017 in the Netherlands shows, other interme-
diate cases included EU trade agreements that may have
contributed to polarizing political debates in a small sub-
set of member states, yet neither became salient for the
general European public, nor elicited significant actor ex-
pansion across the EU as a whole.
This skewed distribution of politicization is by no
means an exclusive feature of the politics of EU trade
agreement negotiations. The political dynamics under-
lying the EU participation in multilateral trade negoti-
ations, the administration of EU unilateral trade policy
measures, and EU responses to dispute settlement pro-
cedures at the WTO, display similarly diverse patterns
of politicization. The vocal street protests surrounding
negotiations for the launch of the so-called Millennium
Round of WTO negotiations in Seattle stand in contrast
to the relative quiet with which other major multilateral
trade rounds such as the Tokyo or Kennedy round have
been negotiated in the past or the launch of the Doha
Development Agenda (Poletti & De Bièvre, 2016). The
large scale political protests triggered by the US-initiated
WTO disputes against EU bans on imports of genetically
modified crops or hormone-treated beef also stand in
contrast with the little noise elicited by other equally, if
notmore, economically important trade disputes (Poletti
& De Bièvre, 2014). This overview (summarized suc-
cinctly in Table 1) suggests that the puzzle at hand con-
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sists of explaining the varying degrees of politicization,
rather than politicization of EU trade policy in general.
3. Some Plausible (Necessary but not Sufficient)
Conditions for Politicization
A whole range of arguments about EU trade policy politi-
cization have been advanced to account for politicization
across EU trade agreement negotiations. The recent con-
tribution by Meunier and Czesana (2019) systematizes
this literature by evoking explanations for variation in
salience of EU trade negotiations. Besides also taking
polarization and actor expansion into account, in addi-
tion to salience, we draw and expand on this contribu-
tion in two ways. First, we make use of the overview of
(non-)cases of politicization to conduct a brief plausibil-
ity probe of some of the most prominent explanations
for this phenomenon. In doing so, we pay particular at-
tention to specifying whether the considered explana-
tory factors represent necessary and/or sufficient con-
ditions for the politicization of EU trade agreement ne-
gotiations. In this section, we therefore conduct a ten-
tative and speculative probe of the explanatory power
of existing arguments, and assess whether these factors
unfold their explanatory force only in conjunction with
other causes or suffice in and of themselves to produce
politicization. We do so to lay the ground for how these
can be usefully conceived as structural background con-
ditions and allow one to bring agency back into the equa-
tion in Section 4.
3.1. Variation in European and National Parliamentary
Control over EU Trade Policy
One plausible argument for the politicization of EU trade
negotiations points to the effects generated by the in-
creasing control over EU trade policy by the European
Parliament (EP) introduced with the institutional reform
of the Treaty of Lisbon of 2009. This mandated that EU
trade agreements be ratified by a simple majority of
members of the EP, turning this institution into a formal
veto player in the policy process (Woolcock, 2010). EU
trade agreement negotiations characterized by a high de-
gree of politicization have taken place in the post-Treaty
of Lisbon period, i.e., TTIP and CETA negotiations. While
salience of EU trade agreements went up, polarization
of opinions within the EP did not align along left–right
lines, but cut right through some its most central parties.
While the extreme left and Green faction was united in
opposing EU trade negotiations, the European People’s
Party, and especially the Social-Democratic EP faction of-
ten found themselves split down the middle on the line
to take on some of themost politicized EU external trade
agreement negotiations (De Bièvre, 2018).
Others have claimed that also national parliaments
have started to play a more important role than in the
past in this policy process (e.g., Jančić, 2017; Roederer-
Rynning & Kallestrup, 2017). It is true that national gov-
ernmental coalitions have demanded important recent
bilateral trade agreements to be considered ‘mixed’ (i.e.,
both EU andmember state competence) and hence have
to be presented for ratification according to the national
constitutional requirements,most often including the ap-
proval of the national parliament (Devuyst, 2013, p. 312).
However, only CETA and TTIP negotiations became the
subject of a high degree of politicization in a number of
national legislatures. And secondly, the insistence of EU
member state legislatures to ratify all external EU trade
policy agreements (whether multilateral WTO or bilat-
eral) has been a decade-old constant of EU trade policy
making (Gstöhl & De Bièvre, 2018; Meunier, 2005). This
de facto member state veto over crucial issues, can be
Table 1. Politicization across EU trade agreement negotiations.
EU trade agreement negotiations with Salience Polarization Actor expansion Level of politicization
US–TTIP Yes Yes Yes High
CA–CETA Yes Yes Yes High
Mercosur No No Yes Low first; medium later
Japan No No No Low
Singapore No No No Low
South Korea No No No Low
Ukraine No Yes No Medium
Vietnam No No No Low
Thailand No No No Low
Malaysia No No No Low
CARIFORUM No No Yes Low to medium
Andean Community No No Yes Low to medium
Central America No No No Low
China (Investment) No No No Low
Source: The attribution of level of politicization in the last column is based on the elaboration of Eurobarometer data by Steiner (2018)
and Young (2017); but see also Roederer-Rynning & Kallestrup (2017) for salience in parliamentary debates. The dichotomous categori-
sation of the agreements with regard to the three dimensions of salience, polarization, and actor expansion is our own, cross-validated
with peers.
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the consequence of the expansion of the trade agenda
into matters of regulation within the remit and compe-
tence of EU member states (Young & Peterson, 2006), as
well as of the deliberate strategy to include issues of so-
called mixed EU and member state competence into the
negotiation mandate so as to make national parliamen-
tary approval mandatory (Meunier & Roederer-Rynning,
2020). Parliamentary opportunities to voice andmobilize
opposition towards trade agreements thus constitute im-
portant background conditions for politicization, yet, in
and of themselves do not suffice to account for when po-
litical actors jump to action to capitalize on them.
3.2. Depth and Comprehensiveness of Regulatory
Commitments in Preferential Trade Agreements
Another prominent explanation for the politicization of
EU trade agreement negotiations focuses on the in-
creased depth and comprehensiveness of regulatory
commitments discussed in these negotiations (for a de-
tailed operationalization of regulatory depth and com-
prehensiveness, see Pelkmans, 2017). More specifically,
a number of analyses suggest that politicization should
be traced back to this growing importance of regu-
latory issues within so-called “new generation trade
agreements” (Laursen& Roederer-Rynning, 2017; Young,
2017; Young & Peterson, 2006). However, times are long
gone that a trade agreement only included commitments
to reduce or abolish custom tariffs on trade in goods.
As far back as the conclusion of the Uruguay Round
agreements and the creation of the WTO in 1995, all
trade agreement negotiation agendas included regula-
tory commitments about opening up markets for ser-
vices, access for public procurementmarkets, the respect
of domestic regulations on health and safety, the protec-
tion of intellectual property, the respect for minimum
labour standards, environmental protection, as well as
human rights (Dür, Baccini, & Elsig, 2014). For over 25
years now, researchers have kept on calling this ‘new’…
Still, there would seem to be a compelling logic to
this line of reasoning; the deeper and more comprehen-
sive the commitments have become, the more politi-
cization has occurred. Since regulatory issues touch on
sensitive domestic, behind-the-border issues they are
likely to trigger public suspicion of regulatory downgrad-
ing in the face of international competition, which in
turn should elicit a high degree of politicization. Such re-
actions should therefore be seen as embedded in the
cultural contexts and the values and identities of so-
cial actors (see e.g., Duina, 2019, for an application
to food). However, both logic and empirical evidence—
puzzlingly—show that great depth and comprehensive-
ness of trade agreements do not consistently lead to
greater politicization, perpetuating the question of when
these actors mobilise this background potential, and es-
pecially when they do not.
For one, regulatory cooperation does not need to
translate into lower regulation in the EU. The opposite
can be true, as trading partners may engage in regula-
tory upgrading and thus impose costly regulatory bur-
dens onto others via trade agreements (Lechner, 2016;
Poletti & Sicurelli, 2012; Young, 2015). Moreover, the ar-
gument stands at odds with the empirical observation
that trade agreements containing deep regulatory pro-
visions similar to those in TTIP and CETA, such as the
EU–Japan agreement, have not elicited large scale politi-
cization (Suzuki, 2017). In the TTIP negotiations, EU pol-
icy makers actually tabled less deep and comprehensive
proposals on trade in services than in EU–Japan nego-
tiations by adopting a so-called positive list approach,
specifying which services sectors they would open up to
American competition (Pelkmans, 2017). By contrast, ne-
gotiators adopted a far more ambitious and deep type of
commitment approach in the agreements with Canada
and Japan by only writing a negative list of those ser-
vices sectors which would be exempted from the general
rule that all services sectors would be liberalized. Again,
while it may be necessary for a trade agreement to be
‘deep’ to trigger politicization, depth alone clearly does
not suffice.
3.3. Relative Economic Size and (Perceptions of)
Bargaining Power of the Trading Partner
A third candidate for explaining when politicization oc-
curs, is the economic size and bargaining power of the
negotiating partner. The larger the market of the EU rel-
ative to its negotiating partner, the greater the costs part-
ners might be willing to incur in order to gain access to
it (Damro, 2012; Dür, 2010). This suggests that EU agree-
ments with smaller trading partners should be less politi-
cized than those with partners of a roughly equal eco-
nomic size. This is so because economic asymmetries
make sure that the EU negotiates out of a position of
strength, minimizing the risk that it has to make con-
cessions on sensitive regulatory issues. This argument is
consistent with observed patterns of politicization in the
TTIP negotiations,whichmany observed to be somewhat
linked to EUmember state perceptions of the US as a ne-
gotiating partner with more bargaining power than the
EU (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015; Garcia-Duran Huet &
Eliasson, 2018).
However, the argument is somewhat inconsistent
with the high degree of politicization that characterized
the CETA negotiations, i.e., negotiations with a much
smaller and thus supposedly weaker trading partner. It
is also somewhat at odds with the total absence of
any politicization of the EU–Japan negotiations, admit-
tedly a smaller, but still a very large economic player
in the global trading system. With respect to Canada,
one might argue that contestation over TTIP negotia-
tions and fear of inferior EU bargaining power relative
to the US may well have spilled over into contestation
over the by-then already concluded CETA negotiations.
The CETA and TTIP negotiations were particularly linked
through the controversial issue of investment protec-
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tion and investment arbitration, as opponents stated
that large US-based multinationals would be able to sue
EU governments through their Canadian subsidiaries in
such investor courts. Conversely, this line of argumen-
tation suggests that the negotiations with Japan should
have elicited concerns of having to concede much on
regulatory issues to a relatively powerful trading part-
ner, fears that did not materialize. These arguments
thus again suggest that the impact of relative economic
power (a)symmetries between the EU and its trading
partners probably also has to be seen in conjunctionwith
other conditions.
4. Bringing Agency Back In
So far, we have zoomed in on three important conditions
for politicization—institutional opportunities, regulatory
depth and scope, and bargaining strength. Of course,
there are other conceivable (pre)conditions for politiciza-
tion that could and should be integrated into the compar-
ative analysis of politicization of EU trade agreement ne-
gotiations (Meunier & Czesana, 2019). For instance, the
rise of the internet and social-media represents an im-
portant development enabling the amplification of po-
litical messages, thus potentially bearing on the dimen-
sions of salience and actor expansion. Similarly, it is em-
inently plausible that the growing popular and/or pop-
ulist concerns over the merits of globalization observed
across many EU member states (as in other advanced
democracies) represent background factors relating to
important dimensions of politicization. Yet, defined in
this broad fashion, these arguments make it problematic
to derive hypotheses on variation in degrees of politi-
cization across trade agreement negotiations. For one, in
both cases it is not easy to disentangle to what extent
they point to factors that are independent of, and there-
fore can explain, politicization from processes that are in
fact part of politicization itself. For instance, the use of so-
cial media and growing party confrontations over trade
policy issues are themselves potential manifestations of
processes of polarization and actor expansion. In addi-
tion, both arguments consider long-term processes that
can hardly be useful to account for why trade negotia-
tions taking place largely simultaneously (or in a short-
time span) display such different levels of politicization.
For these reasons, we have not explicitly assessed these
factors in the previous section. At the same time, we sug-
gest that some aspects of these two broad sets of argu-
ments can be usefully qualified with a view to contribut-
ing the development of new potential agency-based ex-
planations of the politicization of EU trade policy.
The elements conducive to politicization we have dis-
cussed so far neglect the role of agency. Our plausibility
probe of these explanations suggests that these struc-
tural conditions need to be present for politicization to
arise, yet do not suffice to produce it, neither alone nor
in conjunction. The argument that agency is crucial to
trigger politicization is not exactly earth-shattering and
there is clear anecdotal evidence about its importance in
triggering the politicization of some EU trade agreement
negotiations. Yet, it begs the question of when, how and
why agency kicks in.
For instance, the successful attempts by organized
groups to instigate and mobilize indignation, distrust,
and opposition in the general public over the content
of the TTIP and CETA negotiations bear witness to the
importance that interest groups purposefully act as in-
stigators and triggers of politicization (Buonanno, 2017;
De Bièvre, 2014, 2018; De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015,
2016; Garcia-Duran Huet & Eliasson, 2018; Siles-Brügge,
2017). It is well documented that civil society actors
make deliberate strategic choices and concentrate their
financial means to “manufacture discontent” (Bauer,
2016) by focussing on a limited set of issues amenable to
mobilizing fear. These included the singling out of topics
that were by no means new or were not even part of the
EU negotiation agenda, yet were singled out as topics for
mobilization against TTIP as well as CETA (Duina, 2019;
Young, 2017). Generating uncertainty and fear about
whether or not the EU ban on the import of hormone
treated beef would be maintained and whether chlori-
nated chicken would come to replace antibiotics-treated
EU chicken were thus singled out by those groups in or-
der to bank on already present salience, and polarize
opinions and further actor expansion. Most importantly
and most successfully, of course, the CSO campaign
against TTIP politicized the ‘Trojan horse’ of investment
arbitration, although that institution has been in exis-
tence for decades, and was about to be reformed as well
as Europeanised (see for an analysis of that politicization
and authority shift, Herranz-Surrallés, 2020). Importantly
however, such singling out of lightning rods to rally mo-
bilization did not happen in reaction to other EU trade
agreement negotiations.
We therefore need to keep a rigorously comparative
perspective in order to move beyond these important
anecdotal observations and develop arguments about
the conditions under which we can expect agents to be
successful in seizing the opportunities their environment
offers them to trigger politicization. In our view, uncover-
ing such agency dynamics in the politicization of EU trade
negotiations requires embracing research into the two-
way interaction between individual level attitudes and
preferences and their aggregation into public opinion on
the one hand, and their deliberate strategic mobilization
and politicization by interest groups and civil society or-
ganizations on the other.
4.1. From Public Opinion to Agency
A first line of inquiry would thus focus on the causal ar-
row going from public opinion to interest group agency.
A growing number of contributions to the interest group
literature have carved out the conditions under which
public opinion can shape the dynamics of interest group
agency. Rasmussen, Carroll, and Lowery (2014) for in-
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stance show that interest groups participate more ac-
tively on issues in policy areas that are regarded as salient
by the general public. Kollman (1998) and Hanegraaff,
Beyers, and De Bruycker (2016) focus on interest groups’
strategies and provide systematic evidence that public
opinion stimulates outside lobbying, i.e., strategies that
seek to raise the awareness of a broader audience by
communicating political messages through various sorts
of public media. Others have shown how public support
for advocates’ policy preferences crucially affects the lat-
ter’s’ chances of success (De Bruycker, 2017; Rasmussen,
Mäder, & Reher, 2018). More generally, Hanegraaff and
Poletti (2019) show that interest groups deem the sup-
port of public opinion as crucial for their survival chances.
These studies suggest the importance of investigating
how individual-level preferences and public opinion con-
tribute to enabling interest groups to act as agents of
politicization in EU trade policy.
On this account, a number of studies have already
shown how individual-level preferences can significantly
account for politicization of TTIP. Jungherr et al. (2018)
have argued that attitudes towards specific trade agree-
ments, rather than towards free trade in general, can
account for the lack of support towards TTIP among
German citizens. They find that postures toward transat-
lantic cooperation, predispositions toward the role of in-
terest groups in politics, as well as towards domesticmar-
ket regulation, constitute important background condi-
tions for the remarkable opposition towards TTIP among
German citizens. Other studies also suggest that varia-
tion in levels of public opposition to TTIP across EUmem-
ber states could be due to citizens’ views of the treaty
partners, like anti-Americanism—at least under the im-
portant condition that the salience of economic issues
is relatively low (Jedinger & Schön, 2018; Steiner, 2018).
However, anti-Americanism alone does not seem to suf-
fice to explain opposition to TTIP, since other EU mem-
ber states with latent anti-Americanism, such as France,
did not witness a similar drop in specific support for TTIP
negotiations (Bauer, 2016;Meunier & Roederer-Rynning,
2020; Young, 2017). The presence of particular predispo-
sitions within the general public is important in shaping
politicization only insofar as it comes in conjunction with
interest groups able and willing to capitalize on this po-
tential and act as agents of politicization (see also Gheyle,
2020). Similarly, Zürn, Binder, and Ecker Ehrhardt (2012),
have convincingly highlighted the potential nexus exists
between authority transfers and politicization: Political
authority migrating from the national to the interna-
tional level can trigger resistance by societal groups
when international institutions cannot build on sufficient
stocks of legitimacy. This argument suggests that CSOs
should be more capable to act as agents of politicization
of trade agreements that reach deeply into practices of
domestic governance when public awareness and scepti-
cism of international institutions are widespread among
the general public. Future research could benefit from
conducting further comparative analyses of all, rather
than only a subset of EU trade agreement negotiations
and parse out under which structural conditions issues
already latently salient among the general public facili-
tate various kinds of interest groups, particularly CSOs,
in their attempts to politicize EU trade policy. It would
thus be worthwhile to analyse comparatively the ex-
tent to which instances of interest group success in act-
ing as agents of politicization of EU trade policy issues
can be traced back to how public opinion facilitated
these groups’ ability to mobilize, attract resources, de-
cide upon a particular lobbying strategy, and successfully
exert pressure on policymakers.
4.2. From Agency to Public Opinion
A second line of research could focus on the opposite
causal arrow, namely the mechanisms that connect in-
terest groups to public opinion, as the salience of issues
mayoften be endogenous to and an artefact of groupmo-
bilization. Existing literature shows interest groups can
shape public opinion formation in two ways. First, inter-
est groups can use various means and strategies to af-
fect the public salience of policy issues (Dür & Mateo,
2014, 2016; Flöthe & Rasmussen, 2018; Hanegraaff et al.,
2016). Engaging in various kinds of outside lobbying
strategies, can be instrumental to raising public aware-
ness about policy issues. Second, interest groups may
also contribute to shaping public attitudes on issues they
care about through the frames they convey or by affect-
ing news content (Andsager, 2000; Dür, 2018). The extent
to which interest groups can effectively trigger the politi-
cization of a particular trade policy issue or a particular
negotiation thus largely depends on their ability to stimu-
late the interest and attention of public opinion. Indeed,
increasing public salience of issues can trigger a positive
feedback effect, stimulatingmore groups to join the cam-
paign and thus generating an attention cascade that ulti-
mately makes the issue even more salient (Dür &Mateo,
2014; Halpin, 2011).
These insights on interest groups’ capacity to actively
shape public opinion can be leveraged to increase our
understanding of the dynamics in politicization of EU
trade policy. A wide range of studies have highlighted
the material and cultural conditions that affect the for-
mation of individual-level preferences on trade policy.
The first group of studies usually considers such prefer-
ences as a function of the individual-level welfare effects
of tradepolicy choices (Colantone&Stanig, 2018; Jensen,
Quinn, & Weymouth, 2015; Margalit, 2011), while the
second focuses on the role and identity-based considera-
tion and cultural factors (Mansfield & Mutz, 2009, 2013;
Schaffer & Spilker, 2019). These studies thus contribute
to identifying one important set of micro-foundations of
trade policy formation (Kertzer & Zeitzoff, 2017; Owen
& Walter, 2017). Yet, it is eminently plausible that inter-
est group agency is a crucial factor in mediating howma-
terial and cultural consideration affect individual prefer-
ences and public opinion more broadly over trade policy.
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For instance, Eliasson and Garcia-Duran Huet (2019) and
Garcia-Duran Huet and Eliasson (2018) stress the impor-
tance of rhetorical choices made by interest groups by
showing how the choice of emotive frames by CSOs op-
posing TTIP succeeded in raising public opposition to the
agreement. Dür (2018) similarly shows, through an ex-
perimental research design, that the frames conveyed by
interest groupsmightwell be important in shaping public
opinion over TTIP.
In order to more comprehensively account for high
as well as low degrees of politicization, this line of re-
search could therefore be further expanded in two direc-
tions. For one, one could investigate how other factors
might enable civil society organizations to raise public
opinion awareness over trade policy issues. The capac-
ity of CSOs to use emotive frames or to convey particular
frames may well be conditional on other factors, such as
previous successful experiences of contestation of trade
negotiations by CSOs, the types of lobbying strategies
they employ (e.g., inside vs outside lobbying, or the use
of particular types of media), their organizational charac-
teristics (e.g., national vs. transnational, their amount of
resources), and the characteristic of population of inter-
est groups within which they operate (e.g., its density,
diversity, and volatility). Second, it would be good if fu-
ture research would expand its empirical scope by explic-
itly considering cases in which interest group attempts
to raise the saliency of a particular trade policy issue did
not succeed, so as to try and fully uncover the dynamics
of agency success as well as failure.
5. Conclusion
In this contribution, we have sought to advance the state-
of-the-art on the explanation of different degrees of
politicization of EU trade agreement negotiations dur-
ing the last decade. First of all, we have shown and illus-
trated that research on this important topic can benefit
from following the lead of the more generic research on
politicization in the EU by conceiving of the phenomenon
as consisting of the three dimensions of salience, opin-
ion polarization and actor expansion. This conceptualiza-
tion has the advantage of being broad, while simulta-
neously allowing for a precise empirical mapping of the
variation at hand that can stimulate systematic in-depth
comparative research. Second, we have reviewed three
plausible and relatively common explanations for politi-
cization of these negotiations, namely the alleged in-
crease of parliamentary—both national and European—
scrutiny and involvement in EU trade policy, the depth
and scope of regulatory commitments in trade agree-
ments, and the relative bargaining power, based on eco-
nomic size, of trading partners. Although we show that
these are eminently plausible at first sight, these explana-
tions also face considerable difficulties to account for the
presence as well as the absence of politicization in a lot
of instances. While particular constellations of those fac-
tors may be more or less conducive to politicization, we
have gone on to argue that these factors can be very use-
fully considered background conditions creating the op-
portunity structures within which agency and mobiliza-
tion can unfold. To that end, we have shown how the ex-
isting literature on the mutual interaction between pub-
lic opinion and interest groups can be mobilized to fur-
ther advance research on the politicization of particular
trade agreement negotiations. Given that the EU is cur-
rently in the process of initiating, negotiating, and ratify-
ing a whole set of such agreements, acquiring more in
depth insight into these dynamics will continue to be of
great relevance, both from a purely epistemological and
scientific point of view and for the practical benefit of cre-
ating reasonable expectations about the process of EU
trade policy formation in years to come.
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